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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for analyzing the market and welfare effects of 
mergers that result in multiproduct firms producing strongly demand-related products and derive 
the conditions under which such type of mergers improve welfare. The Tyson-IBP merger is used 
as an empirical application of the model. Using estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities of 
demand for beef, pork, and chicken, we infer that the Tyson-IBP merger has generated the cost-
efficiencies necessary to make consumers and livestock producers better off. 
 
Keywords:  Mergers; Multi-Product Firms; Welfare Effect; Market Effect; Cost-Efficiencies 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n 2001, Tyson Foods, the world largest chicken processor, merged with IBP, the leading beef processor 
and the second largest pork processor; resulting in a new company that ranks first in beef, with 27 percent 
market share; first in chicken, with 23 percent market share; and second in pork, with a market share of 
18 percent. Approval of the merger by the Justice department prompted Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) to re-
introduce the Agricultural Competition Enhancement Act with a provision to review the merger approval process. In 
the Senator’s view - one widely shared by livestock groups at the time - was that “the combination of the nation's 
largest poultry producer with the world's largest producer of beef and pork products would result in significantly 
reduced market opportunities, as well as increase the possibility of anti-competitive business practices….[The] 
combined IBP-Tyson presence in the retail market would negatively affect product choice and the prices consumers 
pay at the meat counter” (Press Release, 2001). 
 
The merger has now been in place for over a decade and, to the authors’ knowledge, with the exception of a 
few general remarks to the press (e.g., McInnis, 2001) and a descriptive essay (Wards and Meyers, 2001) at the 
inception of the merger, economists have been silent on the market and welfare effects of the Tyson-IBP merger. 
This is a void because what distinguishes the merger from other horizontal mergers in the meat industry is that, in 
addition to producing the beef and pork previously produced jointly by IBP, Tyson also produces chicken, which 
substitutes strongly for beef and pork in consumer demand. In that setting, the welfare effects of the merger on the 
marketing chain are determined by equilibrium outputs and prices that are conditioned not only on the own- and 
cross-price elasticities of demand of each product, but also on the merged firm’s multiproduct cost structure, and 
both own- and cross-market responses to variations in its own outputs and prices. 
 
In this article, we 1) provide a general conceptual framework for analyzing the market and welfare effects 
of mergers that result in firms producing strongly demand-related products jointly, 2) derive the condition under 
which such mergers improve social welfare in the marketing channel, and 3) compute a measure for that condition 
for the beef, pork, and poultry marketing channels using available empirical estimates of own- and cross-elasticities 
of demand for the three meats. 
 
In terms of its relation to the merger literature, this paper falls between studies focusing on mergers 
between Cournot firms producing the same homogeneous products (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983; Perry and 
I 
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Porter, 1985; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990) and mergers between Bertrand firms producing differentiated products 
(McElroy, 1993; Deneckree and Davidson, 1985). In the first instance, the approach would be applicable in the food 
industry to mergers between beef packers, for example. Though beef would be demand-related to pork and chicken, 
only the own-price elasticities enter the profit-maximizing calculus of the beef-producing firms. In the second 
instance, the approach would be applicable to mergers of firms that produce, say, ready-to-eat cereals. In this case, 
both own- and cross-price elasticities enter the supply relation of the merged firm. In our case, the own- and cross-
elasticities are key to the analysis, but beef, pork and chicken obviously do not represent variations within a product 
class as do breakfast cereals. 
 
The work most closely related to ours is by Vannoni (2004). He developed a multiproduct monopoly model 
to rationalize the three major views in literature on corporate diversification (the resource efficiency view, the 
managerial or agency view, and market power view) resulting either from mergers between single-product 
monopolists or the introduction of new goods by a single-product monopoly. Vannoni shows that corporate 
diversification depends on the interplay between scope economies from joint production, strategic interactions 
between firms, demand-relatedness, and multi-market contact. 
 
The starting point of our work is a stylized model of two single-product industries, each initially consisting 
of a Cournot duopoly/duopsony. Each product is homogenous and substitutes for the other. A merger takes place 
between a firm in industry 1 and a firm in industry 2. The merged firms maximize joint profits and compete with the 
rest of non-merged firms a la Cournot. The effects of the merger on consumers, farmers, merged and non-merged 
firms are examined by comparing their respective pre-merger and post-merger surpluses. The direction of change in 
social welfare is determined by the interplay between scope economies and demand-relatedness. Using published 
beef, pork, and chicken elasticity estimates to quantify the condition under which a multi-product merger improves 
social welfare, we find that it would be implausible for a Tyson-IBP type merger not to satisfy that condition. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Consider two food processing industries, each consisting of a Cournot duopoly/duopsony. Firms in the first 
industry produce a homogeneous product - call it product 1 - where one unit of farm input is converted into one unit 
of final consumer food product. Denote industry output of product 1 by Q1. Firms in the second industry produce 
product 2, also homogenous and requires one unit of farm input. Industry output of product 2 is Q2. The two 
products, Q1 and Q2, are demand-related with inverse demands: 
 
P = α - 2Q - σQ
1 1 2
 (1) 
 
P = α - 2Q - σQ
2 2 1
, (2) 
 
where 0   and  0, 2   measures the degree of substitutability between the two products.1 The products are 
independent when  = 0 and perfect substitutes when  = 2. 
 
We consider a merger between a firm in industry 1 and a firm in industry 2. The merged entity becomes a 
two-product firm in competition with two single-product firms, one in industry 1 and one in industry 2. The effects 
of the merger on consumers, farmers, and processors are determined by comparing the price, quantity, and welfare 
measures from the pre-merger equilibrium to those of the post-merger equilibrium. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The inverse demands are derived from maximizing the quadratic utility function:      2 2U Q , Q = α Q + Q - Q + Q - σQ Q + m1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 , 
where 
2
m = Y - p Qi i
i=1
  is the portion of the income spent on other goods (Shaked and Sutton, 1990; Symeonidis, 2002). 
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Pre-Merger Equilibrium 
 
Before the merger, the j
th
 firm, for j = 1, 2, in industry 1 supplies product 1 by maximizing profits: 
 
 j jMax π = P - c - w q1 1 11 1jq
1
, (3) 
 
where q1 is output, c1 is marginal processing cost, and w1 is price of the farm input used in the production of good 1. 
The supply schedule for the farm input takes the form: 
 
 w Q = b Q1 1 1 1 , (4) 
 
where b 0
1
 and  1 2q + q = Q1 1 1  
 
Differentiating (3) with respect to 1
jq , for j = 1, 2, substituting for P1 from (1) and w1 from (4) in the first-
order-conditions (FOC), and rearranging yields: 
 
     1 2 1 22 2 + b q + 2 + b q + σq + σq = α - c1 1 1 1 2 2 1  (5) 
 
for firm 1 and 
 
     1 2 1 22 + b q + 2 2 + b q + σq + σq = α - c1 1 1 1 2 2 1  (6) 
 
for firm 2. 
 
In industry 2, the j
th
 firm’s maximization problem, also for j = 1, 2; is: 
 
 j jMax π = P - c - w q2 2 22 21q2
, (7) 
 
where q2 is output, c2 is marginal processing cost, and w2 is the price of the farm input used in the production of 
good 2. Supply of farm input 2 is given by: 
 
 w Q = b Q2 2 2 2 , (8) 
 
where b 0
2
  and  1 2q + q = Q2 2 2 . 
 
Maximizing (7) with respect to 
j
2q , for j = 1, 2, substituting for P2 and w2 using (2) and (8) in the FOC, and 
rearranging yields: 
 
     1 2 1 2σq + σq + 2 2 + b q + 2 + b q = α - c1 1 2 2 2 2 2  (9) 
 
for firm 1 and 
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     1 2 1 2σq + σq + 2 + b q + 2 2 + b q = α - c1 1 2 2 2 2 2  (10) 
 
for firm 2. 
 
Pre-merger equilibrium prices and quantities require simultaneous solution of (5), (6), (9), and (10). For 
tractability, we economize on notation by setting c1 = c2 = 1/2 and all parameters other than σ equal to one. As will 
become clear when we discuss the post-merger equilibrium, σ is one of two parameters crucial in determining the 
market and welfare effects of mergers. The other parameter is the one capturing scope economies (or diseconomies) 
from a merger between multiproduct firms. Table 1 contains pre-merger equilibrium prices, quantities, and welfare 
measures. 
 
Table 1:  Pre-Merger Equilibrium Prices, Quantities, and Welfare 
Aggregate Quantities 
 
1b b
Q = Q =
1 2 2σ + 9
 
Output Prices 
σ + 7b b
P = P =
1 2 2σ + 9
 
Farm Prices 
 
1b b
w = w =
1 2 2σ + 9
 
Aggregate Consumer Surplus 
 
σ + 2b
CS =
2
2σ + 9
 
Farmer Surplus 
 
2
1 1b b
FS = FS =
1 2 2 2σ + 9
 
 
 
 
Aggregate Profits 
 
3 1b b
Π = Π =
1 2 22 2σ + 9
 
Total Economic Surplus 
 
σ + 6b
TES =
2
2σ + 9
 
 
Post-Merger Equilibrium 
 
Firm 1 in industry 1 merges with firm 2 in industry 2 to form a two-product firm. The two products are 
produced jointly with costs: 
 
 1 2 1 2 1 2C q , q = c q + c q - sq q1 2 1 21 2 1 2 , (11) 
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where s is a cost parameter reflecting (dis)economies of scope if it is positive (negative) (Cabral and Villas-Boas, 
2001).
2
 The decision problem for the two-product firm is to: 
 
   m 1 2 1 2Max π = Max P - c - w q + P - c - w q + sq q1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 21 2 1 2q ,q q ,q
1 2 1 2
 
 
 (12) 
 
with respect to 
1
1
q  and 
2
2q . Substituting equations (1), (2), (4) and (8) into the relevant FOC and rearranging, yields 
the expression: 
 
       1 2 1 22 2 + b q + 2 + b q + σq + 2σ - s q = α - c1 1 1 1 2 2 1  (13) 
 
for product 1 and 
 
       1 2 1 22σ - s q + σq + 2 + b q + 2 2 + b q = α - c1 1 2 2 2 2 2  (14) 
 
for product 2. 
 
The other firms not involved in the merger still have the same FOCs as in the pre-merger situation 
(equation 6 and 9). Post-merger equilibrium prices and quantities are obtained by solving (6), (9), (13), and (14) 
simultaneously. Resulting prices, quantities, and welfare measures are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Post-Merger Equilibrium Prices, Quantities, and Welfare 
Aggregate Quantities 
  2
σ - s + 6a a
Q = Q =
1 2 2 12σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27
 
Output Prices 
 
  
2
16σ + σ + 42 - s 10 + σa a
P = P =
1 2 2
2 12σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27
 
Farm Prices 
  
σ - s + 6a a
w = w =
1 2 2
2 12σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27
 
Aggregate Consumer Surplus 
 
  
2
1 σ + 6 - sa
CS = σ + 2
24 12σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 To guarantee non-negative quantities, the cost parameter, s, should be restricted to ( , 3s    . This restriction ensures, at the same 
time, non-negative marginal costs (Appendix A). 
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Table 2 cont. 
Framer Surplus 
  
2
1 σ + 6 - sa a
FS = FS =
1 2 28 12σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregate Profits 
  
  
2
36 +18σ + 2s - s 15 + 4σ
3a a
Π = Π =
1 2 28 2
12σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27
 
Total Economic Surplus 
 
  
2 2 3 2 2
126σ - 81s - 30sσ + 9s + 21σ + σ - 2sσ + s σ + 2161a
TSW =
24 2
12σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27 
 
 
 
MARKET AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF THE MERGER 
 
We measure price, quantity, and welfare effects of the merger by the difference between the post- and pre-
merger equilibrium prices, quantities, and welfare measures reported in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
Price and Quantity Effects 
 
The respective changes in retail prices, farm prices, and market quantities are given by: 
 
 a bΔP = P - Pi i i =>
  
   
σ - s σ + 23
ΔP =
i 22 12σ + σ + 27 - s 6 + σ 2σ + 9 
 
, 
 
 a bΔw = w - wi i i =>
 
   
s - σ3
Δw
i 22 12σ + σ + 27 - s 6 + σ 2σ + 9

 
 
, 
 
and 
 
 a bΔQ = Q - Qi i i =>
 
   
s - σ3
ΔQ =
i 22 12σ + σ + 27 - s 6 + σ 2σ + 9 
 
. 
 
Since the denominator in the last three expressions is positive (Appendix B.1), it follows that when s > σ , 
consumer prices decline, farm prices rise, and quantities rise. The reverse holds when s < σ . 
 
The preceding results lead to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: If the cost effect, as captured by the cost parameter, s, dominates the substitutability effect, as given 
by σ, then the merger results in an increase in market quantities and farm prices and a decrease in output prices. 
The reverse holds if the substitutability effect dominates the cost effect or in the presence of diseconomies of scope. 
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If these two effects cancel each other out, then the merger has a neutral effect on aggregate quantities and farm and 
output prices. 
 
Consumer and Farmer Surplus Effects 
 
The respective changes in consumer and farmer surplus are given by: 
 
 a bΔCS = CS - CS =>   
 
  
2
108 4 45 21 43 2
ΔCS =
24 2
12 6 27 2 9
ss
s s
   
   
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 
 
 a bΔFS = FS - FSi i i =>
   
   
2
108 + 4σ + 45σ - s 21+ 4σ3 s - σ
ΔFS
2i 8 2
12σ + σ + 27 - s 6 + σ 2σ + 9

 
 
 
 
. 
 
Since    245σ + 4σ +108 - s 21+ 4σ > 0    (Appendix B.2), both consumers and farmers are better off when 
s > σ . The opposite follows. 
 
The preceding welfare results can be summarized in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: If the merger generates efficiency gains that are larger than the substitutability effect, then farmers 
and consumer surpluses increase following the merger. The reverse holds if the substitutability effect is larger than 
the cost effect or in the presence of diseconomies of scope. 
 
Effect on Firm Performance 
 
Non-Merged Firms 
 
To evaluate the effect of the merger on the performance of the non-merged firms, we compare their 
combined pre-merger profits to their post-merger combined profit. Let 
na
Π  and 
nb
Π  be their combined post and 
pre-merger profits, respectively. The change in profits for non-merged firms is: 
 
 n na nbΔΠ = Π - Π =   
 
  
2
18 + 9σ + σ - s σ + 53 σ - s σ + 3
24 2
12σ + σ - 6s - sσ + 27 2σ + 9
 
 
 
 
. 
 
Since the numerator  218 + 9σ + σ - s σ + 5 > 0    (Appendix B.3), it follows that 
n
ΔΠ < 0  whenever s  . 
 
Merged Firms 
 
Let 
mb
Π  and 
ma
Π  be merged firms’ respective pre-merger combined profits and post-merger joint-profit, 
respectively. The change in profits for merged firms is: 
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 m ma mbΔΠ = Π - Π =
  
3 Φ
24 2
12σ + σ - 6s - sσ + 27 2σ + 9 
 
, 
 
where, 
2 3 2 2
405s + 288sσ + 60sσ + 4sσ -162σ - 72s - 24s σ
Φ =
2 3 4 2 2
-108σ - 24σ - 2σ - 2s σ > 0
 
 
 
 
, 
 
which is unambiguously positive for s   (Appendix B.4). 
 
This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: If the cost effect is larger than the degree of substitutability, then the merger is profitable for the 
merged firms but unprofitable for the non-merged firms. The reverse holds in the presence of diseconomies of scope. 
If the cost effect is lower than the degree of substitutability and economies of scope are present, then the merger has 
a positive effect on the non-merged firms. This holds also for the merged entities but only for certain combinations 
of σ and s. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that in the presence of diseconomies of scope ( 0s  ), the non-merged 
firms have a cost advantage over the merged entity and, as a result, produce more and earn higher profits. 
Conversely, if the merger generates cost efficiencies that are larger than the substitutability effect ( s  ), this leads 
to a reduction in non-merged firms’ profits. Therefore, non-merged parties are worse off. 
 
Regarding the merged entity in the presence of economies of scope, it faces a trade-off between cost-
savings and substitutability effect. While the former has a positive effect on profits, the latter has a negative effect. 
Thus, the effect of the merger on the profits of the merged entity is higher when products are independent and cost 
savings are larger. When the degree of substitutability becomes larger, coupled with diseconomies of scope ( 0s  ), 
the merged parties’ profit decreases and hence the merger is disadvantageous for the merging parties. It follows that 
the presence of economies of scope is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for this type of a merger to be 
profitable. 
 
Total Economic Surplus 
 
Let 
a
TES  and 
b
TES  be post and pre-merger social surplus, respectively. The change in social surplus is: 
 
 a bΔTES = TES - TES =>
  
   
2
9 3σ + 9 - s 15s - 6σ + 3sσ - σ
ΔTES =
2
2
4 12σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27 2σ + 9 
 
, 
 
which can be shown to be positive when 
 
 
σ σ + 6
s >
3 σ + 5
 (Appendix 1.5). This leads to our fourth proposition: 
Proposition 4: The merger is welfare enhancing (reducing) provided that
 
 
σ σ + 6
s >
3 σ + 5
 (
 
 
σ σ + 6
s <
3 σ + 5
). The 
merger has a neutral effect on welfare if products are independent and cost-savings are ruled out (i.e., σ = s = 0). 
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MODEL APPLICATION 
 
To exactly find out which of the relationships between σ and s holds, as suggested by the four propositions, 
one needs information on both parameters. Since neither is available, we focus our attention on computing σ 
because, as we demonstrate below, it can be approximated from available estimates of own- and cross-price 
elasticities. The computed σ provides a threshold of the cost-efficiencies necessary to improve social welfare. 
However, since the σ in the stylized model is for a two-good case, while the Tyson-IBP merger involves three 
goods, we devise a procedure that embeds available empirical estimates of own- and cross-elasticities of beef, pork, 
and chicken in the inverse demand function (1 and 2) and solve for σ. 
 
The starting point of the procedure is to assume equation (1) represents inverse demand for chicken (qc) and 
equation (2) represents inverse demand for a composite good aggregating beef and pork (qm). The revised demands 
are rewritten as: 
 
P = 1- 2q - σqc c m  (1’) 
 
P = 1- 2q - σqm m c . (2’) 
 
Next, convert the two prices and quantities into logs and take the total differential to obtain: 
 
dlnp = -2dlnq - σdlnqc c m  (15) 
 
dlnp = -2dlnq - σdlnqm m c  (16) 
 
Solving simultaneously for cdlnq and mdlnq  yields: 
 
 
σdlnp - 2dlnpm cdlnq =c 2
4 - σ
 (17) 
 
and 
 
 
σdlnp - 2dlnpc mdlnq =m 2
4 - σ
, (18) 
 
Multiplying through (17) by 
2
4 - σ
dlnqc
 
  
 
 gives: 
 
  dlnpdlnp2 cm4 σ σ 2
dlnq dlnqc c
  
   
   
   
=>   σ 224 - σ = -
η ηcm cc
 
 
 
, (19) 
 
where 
dlnqcη =cm
dlnpm
 
 
 
 is the elasticity of chicken with respect to the price of the composite good (beef and pork) 
and 
dlnqcη =cc
dlnpc
 
 
 
 is the own-price elasticity of chicken. 
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Multiplying through (18) by 
2
4 - σ
dlnqm
 
  
 
 yields: 
 
  dlnp dlnp2 c m4 σ σ 2
dlnq dlnqm m
  
   
   
   
=>   σ 224 - σ = -
η ηmc mm
 
 
 
, (20) 
 
where 
dlnqmη =mc
dlnpc
 
 
 
 is the price elasticity of the composite good with respect to the price of chicken and 
dlnqmη =mm
dlnpm
 
 
 
 is the own-price elasticity of the composite good. 
 
From (19) and (20), it follows that: 
 
σ 2 σ 2
- = -
η η η ηmc mm cm cc
   
   
   
 (21) 
 
Equation (21) implies: 
 
1 1
-
η ηmm ccσ = 2
1 1
-
η ηmc cm
 
 
 
 
  
 (22) 
 
Assume the composite good takes the form: 
 
   q = q P , P , P + q P , P , Pm p c p p cb b b , (23) 
 
where bq  and pq  are the respective quantities of beef and pork and Pb , Pc  and Pp  are the respective prices of 
beef, chicken, and pork. Differentiating (23) with respect to Pm , Pc  yields the expression for ηmm  and ηmc  in 
terms of own and cross-elasticities for the three meats. 
 
   η = S η ε + η ε + η ε + S η ε  + η ε + η εmm pm cm pp pm pc cmPb bb bm bp bc pb bm  (24) 
 
   η = S η ε + η ε + η + S η ε  + η ε + ηmc pp pc pcPc Pb bb bc bp bc pb bc  (25) 
 
The expression for cm  is: 
 
dq dq P dPP Pc c c cm m= = ε ηcm cc
dP q dP q dP Pm c c c m c
     
     
     
 (26) 
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q
bS =
b qm
is the share of beef quantity in the composite good, 
qp
S =p
qm
 is the share of pork quantity in the total 
composite good, P = S P + S Pm p pb b
 is the price of the composite good, 
dP Pi mε =
im dP Pm i
 
 
  
 is the price elasticity 
of the i
th
 meat with respect to the price of the composite good and 
Pdq jiη =
ij dP q
j i
 
 
  
 for j = c, p, b, and i= c, p, b is the 
price elasticity of demand for three meats with respect to the price of beef and pork, respectively. 
 
To obtain numerical measures for (24), (25), and (26), we obtained the cross and own elasticities of pork, 
chicken, and beef from Huang and Haidacher (1989) and estimated our own elasticities of price of beef and pork 
with respect to price of chicken ( bcε  and Pcε ) by regressing the logarithmic price of beef on that of chicken and 
pork, respectively. Similarly, we estimated the elasticities of price of beef, pork, and chicken with respect to the 
price of the composite good ( bmε , pmε  and cmε ) by regressing the logarithmic price of beef, pork, and chicken on 
that of the composite good, respectively. 
 
Substitution of the numerical estimates of (24), (25) and (26) into 22 yields a  = 0.37. Based on the results 
summarized in Proposition 2, consumers and farmers are better after the merger if the cost savings exceed 0.37 
percent. Based on Proposition 4, the value of  implies that the merger improves social welfare if the cost savings 
are larger than 0.15 percent. The threshold values of 0.37 and 0.15 should be considered as crude approximations, at 
best, since  is not independent of the values of the price elasticities and the parameter values and functional forms 
of consumer demand, farm supply, and processing cost relationships used to formulate the stylized model. 
 
However, as long as beef, pork, and chicken own- and cross-price elasticity estimates in the literature do 
not radically deviate from one another, and we do not expect properly estimated ones to do so, the value of  should 
not deviate radically from 0.37 either. In that case, we can expect that a mega merger, like Tyson-IBP, to generate 
that much cost savings, thereby making consumers and farmers better off as explained in Proposition 2. We are not 
so confident about the condition for social welfare improvement in Proposition 4 because, unlike the result in 
Proposition 2, the result in Proposition 4 is not insensitive to the structure of the stylized model and the assumed 
parameter values used therein. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has examined the implications of a merger between firms with undifferentiated demand-related 
products. This type of a merger results in a multiproduct firm where optimal output is conditioned not only on the 
firm’s multiproduct cost structure, but also on both own- and cross-market responses to variations in its own outputs 
and prices, and on the own- and cross-price elasticities of demand of each product. Overall, the effects of this type of 
a merger hinge on the magnitude of the substitutability effect relative to that of the cost effect. Thus, analytical 
results reveal that if the merger generates cost savings through economies of scope that are larger than the 
magnitude of the substitutability effect, then the merger is welfare-improving and hence socially desirable. Apart 
from the non-merged firms, which are worse off, all the remaining participating parties (i.e., farmers, consumers and 
the merged entity) are better off. On the other hand, if the size of the substitutability effect is larger than that of the 
cost effect or in the presence of diseconomies of scope, the merger reduces total economic surplus and hence is 
socially undesirable. 
 
Results from the application of the model to Tyson-IBP merger reveal that as long as the cost savings are 
larger than 0.15 percent, the Tyson-IBP merger improves consumer and farmer welfare. Although we do not know 
whether or not the actual cost savings of the merger are larger or smaller than the 0.15 percent, it would seem 
implausible that Tyson would have opted for a mega merger that generates less than 1 percent in cost savings! The 
conclusion is that the merger may not be as harmful as some policy makers and livestock producers thought. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
To establish the restriction ( , 3s    , we note that: 
 
  
31 2
q = q =
1 2 2
2 12σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27
 
 
  
σ - s + 32 1
q = q =
1 2 2
2 12σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27
 
 
For 
2
q
1
 and 
1
q
2
 to be positive, s should be restricted to: 
 
  
9 + 3σ
s ( -, σ + 3 [ σ + 3 + , + )
6 + σ
     (A.1) 
 
For 
1
q
1
 and 
2
q
2
 to be positive, s should be restricted to: 
 
 
9 + 3σ
s -, σ + 3 +
6 + σ
 
 
 
 
 (A.2) 
 
It follows from (A.1) and (A.2) that s should be restricted to s ( -, σ + 3   to ensure that both quantities 
are positive. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
B.1 Given the restriction s ( -, σ + 3   to ensure positive quantities, it follows that    0212σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27  . 
Multiplying through the latter inequality by  2σ + 9  yields     0212σ + σ - s 6 + σ + 27 2σ + 9  . 
 
B.2 For s   and s ( -, σ + 3  , it follows that σ s 3 + σ  . Multiplying both side of the latter inequality by 
 - 21+ 4σ  throughout gives: 
 
 2 2-63 - 33σ - 4σ < -s 21+ 4σ -21σ - 4σ  (B.2.1) 
 
Adding  245σ + 4σ +108  on both sides of the B.2.1 and rearranging gives: 
 
   245 +12σ < 45σ + 4σ +108 - s 21+ 4σ 108 + 44σ    (B.2.2) 
 
Since σ > 0 , therefore,    245σ + 4σ +108 - s 21+ 4σ > 0   . 
 
B.3 To show that  > 0, rewrite it as: 
 
     2 3 2 3 2Φ = s - σ 162 +108σ + 24σ + 2σ + s 243 +180σ + 36σ + 2σ - s 24σ + 2σ + 72    . 
 
The first term is positive as long as s > σ . To sign the above formula, it suffices to sign the second term. 
For s   and s ( -, σ + 3  , it follows that σ s 3 + σ  . -(24σ +2σ2 +72)  
 
 2 3 2 2 3-216 -144σ - 30σ - 2σ -s 24σ + 2σ + 72 -72σ - 24σ - 2σ   (B.3.1) 
 
Adding  2 3243 +180σ + 36σ + 2σ  on both sides of (1.3.1) results in: 
 
  2 2 3 227 + 36σ + 6σ 243 +180σ + 36σ + 2σ - s 24σ + 2σ + 72
2
243 +108σ +12σ


 (B.3.2) 
 
Since σ > 0 , therefore,   2 3 2243 +180σ + 36σ + 2σ - s 24σ + 2σ + 72 0 . The result implies that 
  2 3 2243 +180σ + 36σ + 2σ - s 24σ + 2σ + 72 0  is always positive provided that s > σ . 
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B.4 The first term in the numerator,  3σ + 9 - s , is always positive, the reason being s ( -, σ + 3   
or - s 3 + σ   . Multiplying by (-1) on both sides of the latter inequality yields  - 3 + σ -s +   . Adding 
 3σ + 9  throughout yields: 
 
2σ + 6 3σ + 9 - s +   . Therefore, the sign of TES  depends on that of  215s - 6σ + 3sσ - σ . The latter term is 
positive when 
 
 
σ σ + 6
s >
3 σ + 5
. 
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NOTES 
